This study investigates whether the transfer paradox (donor enrichment and/or recipient impoverishment) occurs when a donor and a recipient have different population growth rates by using a one-sector, two-country overlapping generations model. We show that if the population growth rates differ, neither donor enrichment nor recipient impoverishment occurs in the steady state under dynamic efficiency. This result is in stark contrast to the existing results that the transfer paradox might occur when a donor and a recipient country have different marginal propensities to save, assuming that both have the same population growth rate. Furthermore, we present the condition for the transfer problem to occur on the transition path and show that the transfer paradox is less likely to occur as the economy converges to the steady state.
were the first to show that the transfer paradox occurs in an OLG setting. However, all of the existing literature on the transfer paradox in an OLG model assumes for brevity that a donor and a recipient have the same population growth rate. We extend the model to include different population growth rates and find that the existing result on the occurrence of the transfer paradox is limited to the special case in which the population of a donor and a recipient grows at the same rate.
In a static general equilibrium framework, ever since the seminal papers of Samuelson (1952 Samuelson ( , 1954 , it has generally been established that in a two-country model, the transfer paradox can never occur if the equilibrium is Walrasian stable and there are no trade distortions. For the transfer paradox to arise in a static model, there must be Walrasian instability or distortions such as trade barriers and administrative transfer costs that restrict free trade. 1 By contrast, in a dynamic framework, existing studies have shown that the transfer paradox can arise even without any distortions in a two-country model. Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) pointed out that a permanent lump-sum transfer can bring about the transfer paradox in the steady-state equilibrium by using an OLG model. Haaparanta (1989) showed that a temporary transfer accompanied by an issue of government bonds might cause the transfer paradox in an OLG model. Cremers and Sen (2008) showed that the results obtained by Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) also apply not only in the steady state, but also on the transitional path. Overall, in the OLG framework, the existing literature has demonstrated that the transfer paradox can arise even if the market equilibrium is stable because the change in the interest rate caused by a transfer intertemporally affects capital accumulation. However, all studies that have investigated the transfer paradox in a dynamic setting assume that the donor country and the recipient country have the same population growth rate. 2 Although this simplifying assumption undoubtedly improves the tractability of the transfer problem in a dynamic framework, it sacrifices generality and does not coincide with the real situation. Typically, a donor country has a different population growth rate to that of a recipient, and developed countries as donors tend to have lower population growth rates than developing countries. 3 For example, the top four countries that provided official development assistance (ODA) in 2013 were the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, and the top four countries that received ODA in 2009-2010 were Afghanistan, Indonesia, India, and China. 4 Based on UN population projections (United Nations, 2013), Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the population growth rates of the top three countries excluding Afghanistan, indicating that they differ significantly even within donor and recipient countries. 5 Nevertheless, virtually all existing studies of the transfer paradox based on the OLG model assume that donor and recipient countries share the same population growth rate. Therefore, in this study, we consider a more generalized situation by explicitly allowing population growth rates to differ between a donor and a recipient, thereby presenting a novel result. We investigate whether and how the difference in population growth rates between a donor and a recipient affects the possibility of the transfer paradox and shed new light on the conditions for the transfer paradox to arise not only in the steady state, but also on the transitional path.
It is also valuable that the transfer problem should be tackled in the area of development economics. Indeed, whether a transfer improves economic welfare or accelerates economic growth in recipient countries has gained much attention both in theoretical and in empirical studies. Empirically, on the one hand, since Burnside and Dollar (2000) showed that financial aid increases the economic growth rates of recipient countries by using cross-country data, several works have supported the positive relationship between aid and economic growth. On the other hand, Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) reexamined the analysis of Burnside and Dollar (2000) and found no significant relationship between foreign aid and economic growth. However, the empirical controversy has not yet been resolved and must also be approached from a theoretical viewpoint. Azarnert (2008) , Neanidis (2012) , and Vasilakis (2017) theoretically investigated the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth by using an OLG model and derived the conditions for foreign aid to effectively promote economic growth. However, since they assumed only a small open economy, the interaction between donor and recipient countries could not be investigated. Therefore, this study explicitly focuses on a two-country framework in which the transfer problem is considered and investigates how foreign aid affects social welfare when both countries have different population growth rates.
Our novel contribution is that if the donor's and recipient's population growth rates differ, neither donor enrichment nor recipient impoverishment occurs in the steady state when the economy is dynamically efficient. This result holds irrespective of the magnitude of the difference in donor and recipient population growth rates. The result contrasts sharply with the already established finding that the transfer paradox might arise in an OLG model even under dynamic efficiency when both countries' populations grow at the same rate. The intuition for this result is as follows. When the population growth rates of a donor and a recipient are identical, as shown in the existing literature, whether the transfer paradox occurs is completely determined by the relative sizes of the direct effect on income and the indirect effect on the interest rate. By contrast, when a difference in population growth rates between a donor and a recipient exists, slight differences in population completely determine the per capita effect of a transfer on welfare in the steady state, irrespective of the relative sizes of the direct and indirect effects. Our result suggests that the finding that the transfer paradox can arise in an OLG model holds only in special cases when population growth rates happen to be identical. We also investigate the effect of transfers on the transition path.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the transfer problem in a one-sector OLG model when population growth rates differ between a donor country and a recipient country. In Section 3 we present our main result relating to the conditions under which the transfer paradox arises in the steady state. In Section 4 we delineate the transfer problem on the transition path. Section 5 concludes.
| Firms
In both countries, perfectly competitive firms produce output by using labor and capital. The production technology exhibits constant returns to scale, is independent of time, and is identical in both countries. Capital does not depreciate. k i t denotes per capita capital in country i in period t and f ðk i t Þ denotes the per capita production function. f(·) satisfies the following conditions: (i) it is continuously differentiable; (ii) f > 0, f 0 > 0, and f 00 < 0 for all k t > 0; and (iii) f(0) = 0, f 0 ð0Þ ¼ þ 1, and f 0 ðþ1Þ ¼ 0.
Firms of country i maximize their per capita profit in period t, π
t . Profit maximization requires that the marginal productivity of each input be equated to its price as follows:
The interest rate determines the capital level and changes the wage rate. 
| Capital market equilibrium
The world capital market equilibrium in period t requires the aggregate savings of generation t to be equal to aggregate capital demand in the subsequent period t + 1 as follows:
By substituting (7), given that the countries' per capita levels of capital are equalized, we can rearrange (7) as follows:
The transfer balances the budget if
Henceforth, we denote by T ≥ 0 the per capita permanent transfer made by the donor country, that is, T D t ¼ ÀT ≤ 0, assuming that T is constant over time and w t > T for all t. For brevity, we examine the effect of an infinitesimal change in the transfer in the vicinity of T = 0. In the balanced budget of the transfer, the infinitesimal change in the per capita transfer for the recipient country satisfies
We assume that the economy is dynamically efficient, that is, r t ≥ max{n D , n R } for all t.
| STEADY-STATE ANALYSIS
We examine whether the transfer paradox arises in the steady state by evaluating the limit state when t approaches infinity. As t approaches infinity, ð
| 335 equals unity if n D = n R ; and it approaches zero if n D < n R . Given (9), as t approaches infinity,
and it approaches zero if n D < n R . Therefore, given (8), the condition for the world capital market equilibrium in the steady state can be rewritten as follows:
By totally differentiating (10)- (12), we obtain the following equations:
where
. Γ i < 0 and Γ < 0 hold under the condition for dynamic stability, which guarantees that the economy monotonically converges to the steady state. 7 We can summarize the result obtained from (13)-(15) in the following lemma.
Lemma 1
Suppose that the economy is in the steady state. The intuition for this lemma is as follows. In Lemma 1(i), when n D > n R , the aggregate amount of capital of the donor surpasses that of the recipient and the difference in capital increases over time. As a consequence, in the steady state, which can be regarded as an infinite future on the time horizon, the donor's supply and demand of capital completely determine the world capital market equilibrium. Although the recipient's savings are increased by the transfer, they cannot have any effect on the world savings. By contrast, the transfer decreases the donor's per capita savings, which almost equivalently affects the world capital level in per capita terms, and the decrease in world capital raises the interest rate. Lemma 1(ii) is a well-established result in the existing literature since Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) first showed that when the population growth rate is equal in both countries, the difference in the marginal propensity to save determines whether the interest rate rises. In Lemma 1(iii), in contrast to Lemma 1(i), in the steady state when n D < n R , the world capital market is determined by the recipient's capital. However, as the recipient's population grows larger than the donor's population, the per capita transfer received by the recipient's individuals approaches zero over time, that is, dT R →0. Thus, the effect on the interest rate also converges to zero, dr→0, as time passes. Too small a per capita transfer by the donor with a low population growth rate does not have any effect on the recipient's savings and the transfer affects neither world capital nor the interest rate.
We now examine the effect of the transfer on welfare. By totally differentiating the indirect utility function (5), and normalizing the marginal utility to be unity without loss of generality, we obtain
By substituting (13)- (15) into (16), we obtain the following equations on the effect of the transfer on welfare in the steady state:
To evaluate the effect on the recipient's welfare, note that when n D > n R , the limit of ð
approaches infinity over time. By contrast, when n D < n R , dT R approaches zero as t grows, that is,
Therefore, when n D < n R , the transfer has no effect on the recipient's welfare over time.
Using (17) and (18), we examine all three cases in detail. First, we consider the case in which n D > n R . In this case, the effects of the transfer on the welfare of both countries satisfy
The first and second terms on the underbraces of (19) and (20) represent the indirect and direct effects of the transfer, respectively. The direct effect is the change in income brought about by the transfer from the donor to the recipient. The sign of the direct income effect is necessarily negative (positive) for the donor (recipient). The indirect effect is brought about by the change in the interest rate in the world capital market through the change in capital accumulation, and its sign depends on the situation. Note that s D = (1 + n D )k ≤ (1 + r)k as long as the condition for the capital market equilibrium, (10) and the dynamic efficiency condition are satisfied. Therefore, in the steady state when n D > n R , the sign of the donor's indirect effect is necessarily negative and dV D /dT < 0. In other words, when the population growth rate of the donor exceeds that of the recipient, donor enrichment does not arise in the steady state. Although the sign of the recipient's indirect effect is ambiguous, because the positive direct effect infinitely increases with time, it eventually dominates the indirect effect, dV R /dT > 0. As a result, when the population growth rate of the donor exceeds that of the recipient, the recipient's welfare improves in the steady state. Second, we consider the case in which n D = n R . When both countries have the same population growth rate, whether the transfer paradox arises depends on the relative size of the donor's and recipient's marginal propensities to save. This has already been examined in the existing literature following the work of Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) . In this case, the effects of the transfer on the welfare levels of both countries are found to be
The first and second terms in the brackets of (21) and (22) 
, the indirect effect of the transfer on the interest rate for the recipient, which is denoted by the first term in the brackets of (22), is necessarily negative and recipient impoverishment may occur. By contrast, when s R w > s D w , the indirect effect of the transfer on the interest rate for the donor, which is denoted by the first term in the brackets of (21), is necessarily positive and donor enrichment may occur. As shown in the existing literature, when the population growth rates are identical, whether the transfer paradox arises depends on the relative marginal propensities to save of both countries.
Finally, in the case of n D < n R , there is no indirect effect for the donor and any transfer no longer affects the recipient. Therefore, as shown in (17) and (18), dV D /dT and dV R /dT approach −1 and 0, respectively, as time goes to infinity. Since the steady state is the state in the limit of the variable with respect to time, when the recipient's population growth rate exceeds the donor's, the transfer does not affect the interest rate in the steady state. Because the difference in population growth rates eliminates the indirect effect of the transfer on the interest rate, there is no donor enrichment. Moreover, the effect of the transfer on the recipient's welfare is negligible in the steady state. In sum, no transfer from the donor to the recipient improves both countries' welfare. Hence, no Pareto-improving welfare outcome can be attained through transfers because the donor's welfare deteriorates and the recipient's welfare is unaffected by the transfer.
We summarize our main result in the following proposition. Proposition 1 claims that when both countries have the same population growth rate, the difference in the marginal propensity to save determines whether the transfer paradox occurs, while when they have a different population growth rate, the savings of the more populous country determine the world capital level and the effect of the transfer on the welfare of both countries. The result of Proposition 1(i) has been well established in the existing literature on OLG models of the transfer paradox; see, in particular, Cremers and Sen (2008) .
The intuition for Proposition 1(ii) is that the effect of any per capita transfer to a less (more) populated country is more (less) amplified. When n D > n R , the effect of the transfer on the donor's welfare is necessarily negative because both the direct and the indirect effects are negative. For the recipient, the positive direct effect on welfare necessarily dominates the indirect effect regardless of its sign. When n D < n R , because the effect on the capital market of a transfer from a less populated country eventually dissipates, the indirect effect is also nullified. Hence, for the donor, only the negative direct effect of the transfer persists, which deteriorates the donor's own welfare. By contrast, because the per capita transfer received by the recipient diminishes over time (to zero in the steady state), the recipient does not benefit from the transfer. The transfer by the donor is only a drop in the ocean for the recipient. Proposition 1 emphasizes that the impact of the transfer on welfare depends significantly on whether the donor and recipient share the same population growth rate. This result suggests that the existing finding that the transfer paradox can arise in a dynamic OLG model incorporating capital accumulation represents a special case that is contingent on both countries having the same population growth rate. Contrary to conventional wisdom on the possibility of the transfer paradox arising, Proposition 1 affirms that even a slight difference in population growth rates destroys this possibility in the steady-state equilibrium. As for the impossibility of the transfer paradox, since the work of Samuelson (1952 Samuelson ( , 1954 , it is known that in a static framework, no transfer paradox occurs when the market is Walrasian stable in a free trade economy. By contrast, in a dynamic framework, the existing literature shows that the transfer paradox can arise even in a world capital market with free capital mobility that satisfies Walrasian stability. However, our result claims that the conditions for the transfer paradox to occur are restrictive, even in a dynamic setting.
| ANALYSIS ON THE TRANSITIONAL PATH
In this section, we investigate the transitional path to the steady-state equilibrium. First, in Section 4.1, we consider the young and old generations in the initial period. Then, in Section 4.2, we delineate the subsequent transitional generations.
| The initial young and old generations
In the initial period, t = 1, the amount of capital is given, and the transfer in period t = 1 affects neither the wage nor the interest rate; that is, dw 1 = 0 and dr 1 = 0. Clearly, the initial old generations of both countries are unaffected by the transfer. In period 2, the capital market equilibrium condition is
As dT = −dT D > 0, the budget-balancing transfer satisfies
By totally differentiating (23) with respect to (r 2 ,T), we obtain
where From (26), we obtain the effect of the transfer on the interest rate at t = 2, denoted by r 2 . Under Walrasian stability, the sign of dr 2 /dT is determined by the difference in the donor's and recipient's marginal propensities to save. This difference is positive (negative) if the donor has a higher (lower) propensity than the recipient.
The indirect utility function of the initial young generation depends on (w 1 + T i ,r 2 ) and dw 1 = 0 at t = 1. The total differentiation of the indirect utility function with respect to (r 2 ,T i ) gives
By substituting (26) into (27), we obtain the following effect on welfare for the initial young generations of both countries:
From (28) and (29), the proposition below follows.
Proposition 2
Consider the initial young generation. Donor enrichment and recipient impoverishment cannot occur simultaneously. More precisely,
According to Proposition 2(i), if the donor has a sufficiently higher propensity to save than the recipient, then donor enrichment occurs. The reason is that, in case (i), the transfer reduces the amount of capital available in the next period. Hence, the donor earns a higher return on the capital invested in the recipient country through the higher interest rate. However, according to Proposition 2(iii), a recipient that is a sufficiently enthusiastic saver suffers impoverishment. The transfer lowers the welfare of the initial young generations in both countries in case (iii) because the increase in savings by the recipient's initial young generation brought about by the transfer exceeds the fall in savings in the donor country. The increase in total savings lowers the interest rate by reducing the return on capital. The greater decline in the interest rate brings about recipient impoverishment. According to Proposition 2(ii), for intermediate differences in marginal propensities to save, there is no transfer paradox.
9
Whether the indirect effect of the transfer dominates the direct effect determines whether the transfer paradox arises. However, the indirect effect on the initial young generation differs significantly from that in the steady state. In the steady state, the decrease in the interest rate caused by the transfer raises the wage for the next generation. The benefit of higher wages carries over to subsequent generations through capital accumulation, as shown by (17) and (18). By contrast, because no generation precedes the initial young generation, no intergenerational effects through wage changes carry over. This difference in the indirect effect on the initial young generation and that in the steady state gives rise to a difference in the result relating to whether the transfer paradox arises. In particular, when n D > n R , the indirect effect is necessarily negative in the steady state, irrespective of the relative size of the marginal propensities to save, as shown by (17). However, under the same condition, the indirect effect on the initial young generation can be positive or negative depending on the condition shown in Proposition 2. This difference arises because the accumulation of intergenerational effects accentuates the indirect effect in the steady state.
| Transitional generations
We now consider the welfare of generation t in both countries. We restate the condition for the capital market equilibrium in period t and the budget-balancing transfer condition, respectively, as follows:
By totally differentiating (30) with respect to (w t , r t+1 ,
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Because of the Walrasian stability condition on the capital market in period t + 1, it follows that Δ t+1 < 0.
From (33), the interest rate in period t + 1 depends on both the transfer in period t and the interest rates before period t. That is, the interest rate is determined recursively by previous interest rates.
By totally differentiating the indirect utility function with respect to (w t , r t+1 , T i ), we obtain
By substituting (33) and dw t = −k t dr t into (34), we obtain the following welfare effects for both countries:
From (35) and (36) we can determine the overall effects of a permanent transfer on the welfare of generation t in both the donor and the recipient countries. The coefficient of dr t in (35) and (36) . The accumulated indirect effect is generated by the intertemporal substitution between consumption and savings for every young generation. This is because the permanent change in the interest rate caused by the transfer reallocates savings and consumption and changes the path of capital accumulation. This change affects the capital-to-labor ratio in production. The coefficient of dT represents the combined current indirect effect and the direct income effect. The former relates to the contemporary indirect effect caused by the change in the current interest rate r t+1 faced by the current generation. The transfer made by the present generation of the donor country, T, affects the next period's interest rate as well as the terms of trade for capital in each country. The current indirect effect is driven by the change in the intragenerational terms of trade. The final effect is a direct income effect, which arises because the transfer decreases the donor's income and increases that of the recipient.
Because (33) is the recurrence relation of dr t+1 and the initial term is dr 1 = 0, we can solve dr t in explicit form as follows:
A tÀs k tÀs
Unfortunately, the explicit calculation of the transfer's welfare effect is too complex. Instead, since the approach of t to infinity can be interpreted as convergence to the steady state, we attempt to delineate what happens with regard to the effect of the transfer on welfare when t becomes sufficiently large. Our result relating to transitional generations provides a useful understanding of Proposition 1(ii) (35) and (36) that the coefficients of dr t are positive, which implies that the accumulated indirect effect is negative in both countries. 10 The direct income effect of the donor (recipient) is negative (positive) and the current indirect effect is positive for both the donor and the recipient. Therefore, when the donor has a higher propensity to save than the recipient, in terms of the current indirect effect, donor enrichment is likely to occur, whereas recipient impoverishment is unlikely. However, under the additional assumption mentioned above, the accumulated indirect effect has the opposite sign to the current indirect effect because dr t > 0 implies that this effect is negative. In terms of the accumulated indirect effect, donor enrichment is unlikely, whereas recipient impoverishment is likely. There exist two countervailing indirect effects that affect the likelihood of the transfer paradox arising. Finally, consider the opposite case when s D w < s R w for all t. B t > 0 for all t, and from (37), dr t < 0. The direct income effect of the donor (recipient) is negative (positive), as in all other cases. However, the current indirect effect is negative for both the donor and the recipient. Therefore, when the recipient has a higher propensity to save than the donor, in terms of the current indirect effect, donor enrichment is unlikely, whereas recipient impoverishment is likely. However, the accumulated effect has the opposite sign to the current indirect effect because dr t < 0 implies that this effect is positive. In terms of the accumulated indirect effect, donor enrichment is likely, whereas recipient impoverishment is unlikely. These two indirect effects offset each other.
We now examine how the probability of the transfer paradox changes over time. When n D > n R , lim t!1 B t =Δ tþ1 has some finite value whose sign is determined by the difference in the marginal propensities to save. When n D < n R , this limit approaches zero. 11 By contrast, irrespective of the relative population growth rates, lim t!1 A t =Δ tþ1 < 0.
12
As for the effect on the donor's welfare in (35), the donor's direct income effect does not change, irrespective of t. Whether the current indirect effect increases depends on the difference between the countries' population growth rates. When n D > n R , the current indirect effect increases over time, although its sign depends on the sign of ðs
It transpires that this current indirect effect exists even in the steady-state equilibrium. When n D < n R , the current indirect effect diminishes over time and, as a result, is irrelevant for the donor's welfare. By contrast, the accumulated indirect effect, which is opposite in sign to the current indirect effect, persists, even over time. Because dr t is the product of several B t /Δ t+1 and A t /Δ t+1 terms, as shown by (37), the accumulated indirect effect persists over time when n D > n R . However, it diminishes over time when n D < n R . In Section 3 we showed that when n D > n R , the positive indirect effect is smaller than the negative direct effect in the steady-state equilibrium and that there is no donor enrichment. Therefore, the sum of the current and accumulated indirect effects diminishes over time. Stated differently, even if the initial generation enjoys donor enrichment, the welfare of subsequent generations continues to decrease over time. As a result, making the transfer certainly decreases the donor's welfare for some "threshold" generation. Thus, there exists a final generation that enjoys donor enrichment. When n D < n R , making the transfer reduces the donor's welfare for all generations.
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Next, we examine the effect on the recipient's welfare in (36). The recipient's direct income effect increases (decreases) with t when n D > (<) n R . Over time, the direct effect becomes infinitely large when n D > n R but otherwise goes to zero. As in the case of the donor's welfare, the sign of the current indirect effect depends on the difference in donor and recipient population growth rates. Over time, the current indirect effect becomes larger when n D > n R , but disappears when n D < n R . As in the case of the donor's welfare, the accumulated indirect effect offsets the current indirect effect in terms of the recipient's welfare. However, when n D > n R , the direct income effect, which approaches infinity, dominates the two indirect effects, and hence there is no recipient impoverishment after the "threshold" generation. By contrast, when n D < n R , because the direct income effect becomes negligible, the relative size of the two indirect effects determines whether recipient impoverishment occurs, and after the threshold generation, the positive accumulated indirect effect exceeds the diminishing current indirect effect.
| CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we investigated whether the transfer paradox can arise in a one-sector, two-country OLG model when the population growth rates of both the donor and the recipient differ. We showed the effects of the transfer on welfare not only in the steady state, but also on the transitional path. Our main finding is that neither donor enrichment nor recipient impoverishment occurs in the steady state when the population growth rates differ, while the paradox might occur under dynamic efficiency only when both countries have the same population growth rate. The result that no paradox occurs when the population grows differently in both countries is satisfied irrespective of the relative size of the donor's and recipient's marginal propensities to save. This result suggests that the existing result on the possibility of the transfer paradox cannot be extended to the general situation in which the population growth rates are different between countries. Our findings reflect the idea that a transfer has a stronger (weaker) impact on the country with the lower (higher) population growth rate. Moreover, the longer the time, the larger the difference in the impact of a transfer. In other words, as time goes on, the transfer attenuates (amplifies) its effectiveness in the recipient country with the higher (lower) population growth rate. It is often argued that transfers have small impacts on a recipient's welfare, even when developed countries as donors sacrifice themselves for developing countries. In a sense, the difference in population growth rates between a donor and a recipient attributes the effectiveness of the transfer on welfare. In particular, when developing recipient countries increase and developed donor countries decrease in population, the impact of a transfer on the recipient's welfare declines over time. Therefore, when the population growth rates differ, our results suggest that, apart from a simple lump-sum income transfer, transfers should be strategically targeted toward technical assistance or infrastructure investment to increase the per capita income of recipient countries effectively.
Furthermore, we showed that even if, in the transition process, there occurs any transfer paradox such as donor enrichment or recipient impoverishment, any paradoxes vanish in the steady state. This result suggests the following policy implication. Since no foreign aid transfer causes the transfer paradox from the long-term perspective, we need not excessively care about any pathological cases of transfer. Stated differently, even if any transfer paradox occurs, it does so only for a short period of time. When donor country policy-makers implementing the aid transfer provide a permanent transfer to recipient countries over the long term, recipient impoverishment is a shortterm concern but not a long-term concern.
We suggest some extensions. First, we did not incorporate the endogenous determination of the population growth rate into our model, although recent economic growth theory uses models of endogenous fertility to analyze steady growth paths. 13 Thus, a possible extension of our study would be to analyze the transfer problem by using a model of endogenous fertility and investigate how the endogenously determined population growth rate influences the effect of transfers on welfare. Second, we ignored the donor's decision-making in setting the transfer level. Hence, our analysis could be generalized by incorporating the determination of optimal transfers. Generally, there is a relationship between the population growth rate and per capita transfers. Worthy extensions of our analysis involve incorporating endogenous population growth rates and optimal transfers.
8 Walrasian stability requires that excess demand for capital should decrease with the interest rate. Since the lefthand and right-hand sides of (23) are the demand for and the supply of capital in period 2, the differentiation of (23) with respect to r 2 yields the Walrasian stability condition, Δ 2 < 0. This sign is automatically satisfied by the assumptions we put forward. Likewise, the Walrasian stability condition of period t is denoted by Δ t < 0. 9 Cremers and Sen (2008) derived the condition under which donor enrichment or recipient impoverishment arises in the initial young generation at the golden rule. The difference between ours and theirs is that our study pays attention to the different population growth rates under the dynamically efficient economy including the golden rule. However, for the initial young generation, the difference in population growth rates between a donor and a recipient is not larger than that for the subsequent generations. When there is little difference in population growth rates, the condition in Cremers and Sen (2008) Galor (2011) for a recent survey on unified growth theory and fertility.
